TINUBU REFORMS: FROM MACROECONOMIC STABILITY TO JOBS, INDUSTRY AND A NEW NIGERIAN ECONOMY –A defensible account of what has changed since 2023 By Amb. Raffy Bello Otun Asiwaju Onigbagbo of Ijebuland

Nigeria has not become an economic paradise under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu.

Inflation, food prices, poverty, insecurity and the rising cost of living remain major concerns, with millions of Nigerians still struggling to meet basic needs.

But acknowledging these realities does not mean that nothing has changed.

A more defensible assessment is that the Tinubu administration has undertaken some of the country’s most consequential economic reforms in decades, while simultaneously pursuing major investments in infrastructure, energy, education, agriculture and industry.

The real question, therefore, is not whether Nigerians are experiencing hardship. They are.

The bigger question is whether the reforms are beginning to change the way the Nigerian economy works and create the foundation for sustained productive growth.

That is where the larger story lies.

For years, Nigeria operated with two major distortions that successive administrations struggled to resolve: the petrol subsidy regime and a foreign exchange system characterised by multiple rates, shortages and opportunities for arbitrage.

The Tinubu administration confronted both.

The petrol subsidy was removed in 2023, while the foreign exchange regime was fundamentally restructured towards greater market determination.

Both decisions produced immediate economic pain and remain subjects of public debate.

But the International Monetary Fund, in its 2026 assessment of Nigeria, said reforms since 2023 had strengthened macroeconomic stability and resilience, citing subsidy removal, the end of deficit monetisation, tighter monetary policy and exchange-rate liberalisation among the key measures. The IMF also reported improvements in external buffers, foreign exchange market functioning and access to international capital markets.

This does not mean Nigeria’s economic problems have disappeared. The IMF has also highlighted continuing challenges, including poverty, food insecurity, inflationary pressures and security risks.

That distinction is important.

Reform can produce macroeconomic improvement while households are still facing hardship.

The significance of the fuel subsidy reform is therefore not simply the price Nigerians pay at filling stations. It is also whether government can maintain a new policy framework when political pressure becomes intense.

The old subsidy regime placed a substantial burden on public finances and created distortions around petroleum pricing, government expenditure and foreign exchange.

The post-subsidy system has shifted much more of that pricing relationship towards market forces.

The result has been painful for consumers, but it has also altered the fiscal architecture of the petroleum market.

The IMF has acknowledged the government’s commitment to avoiding a return to broad fuel subsidies while emphasising the need for stronger social protection for vulnerable Nigerians.

That is the difficult balance at the heart of economic reform: fiscal sustainability must advance alongside measures that protect citizens from the immediate effects of adjustment.

For an investor considering whether to commit $100 million, $500 million or $2 billion to Nigeria, the size of the Nigerian market is only one consideration.

The investor also wants to know whether the rules will remain reasonably predictable, whether major policies will suddenly be reversed and whether an investment can be planned over 10, 20 or 30 years.

Policy consistency is therefore an economic asset.

It does not guarantee investment, nor does it mean every government policy is necessarily correct. But greater predictability can reduce uncertainty and allow businesses to make longer-term investment decisions.

That is the bridge between macroeconomic reform and private capital.

Economic reform cannot end with improved government statistics. Its ultimate test is whether businesses can invest, factories can operate, production can expand and workers can earn sustainable incomes.

This is why Nigeria’s improving macroeconomic indicators matter, but only as a foundation.

The real test is what happens next.

Does capital move into factories? Does production increase? Do companies expand? Do jobs follow? Do household incomes improve?

The Dangote Refinery provides an important case study, although the facts must be stated correctly.

The refinery was conceived, financed and constructed over many years, including before Tinubu assumed office. It would therefore be inaccurate to claim that Tinubu built the refinery.

The stronger argument is that the refinery is now operating within a substantially different policy environment from the one that existed under the old subsidy and foreign exchange regimes.

Reuters reported in September 2026 that the 700,000-barrel-per-day Dangote refinery was operating at full capacity and that the company was preparing an initial public offering involving 4.1 billion shares to raise about N2.15 trillion, or approximately $1.6 billion.

The refinery was valued at about $47.6 billion, with the proceeds expected to support expansion and other corporate objectives.

That development is significant beyond Dangote itself.

It illustrates how a major industrial asset can evolve from a private investment into an instrument of broader capital formation.

A massive industrial enterprise is becoming accessible to public-market investors, creating another pathway through which Nigerians and institutional investors can participate in the ownership of a major domestic industrial asset.

Industrialisation and capital-market development can therefore reinforce each other.

A successful factory generates revenues. Revenues support expansion. Expansion creates demand for capital. Capital markets provide access to investors. Investment supports further production, while production creates demand for labour and services.

That is the ecosystem Nigeria needs to develop across sectors.

A large industrial project does not operate in isolation.

A refinery needs engineers, technicians, logistics operators, banks, insurers, software companies, security firms, maintenance contractors, construction companies, accountants, lawyers, manufacturers and distributors.

The same principle applies to agricultural processors, pharmaceutical companies, mining operations, energy projects, technology firms and infrastructure developments.

The factory is only the centre.

Around it grows an economic ecosystem.

That is where the multiplier effect of industrialisation begins.

The Nigerian middle class cannot be created by government salaries alone. It grows when productive enterprises create sustained employment, professional opportunities and income.

A worker earns a salary.
That salary pays rent, buys food, supports education, finances transportation and telecommunications, pays medical bills and supports consumption.
That consumption creates demand.
Demand creates opportunities for other businesses.

Those businesses employ more workers.

The cycle continues.

This is the foundation of a productive middle class.

That is also why the connection between macroeconomic reform and everyday life is so important.

Foreign reserves are macroeconomic. The exchange rate is macroeconomic. Government revenue is macroeconomic. The fiscal deficit is macroeconomic. Investor confidence is macroeconomic.

But a job is microeconomic. A salary is microeconomic.
A factory is microeconomics. A small business supplying that factory is microeconomics.

The ultimate objective of reform is therefore a transmission mechanism in which macroeconomic stability strengthens investor confidence, investor confidence attracts private capital, private capital expands businesses and factories, production creates jobs, jobs generate household income, household income increases consumption and consumption creates further business demand and investment.

That is the economic chain Nigeria needs to establish and sustain.

This is why the administration’s infrastructure programme also matters.

More than 2,700 kilometres of highways and major roads have been reported by the presidency as being under construction, reconstruction or rehabilitation, including the Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway, Sokoto-Badagry Super Highway, Abuja-Kaduna-Zaria-Kano corridor and East-West Road, alongside other federal and rural roads.

The figure is a government-reported figure and should therefore be understood in that context.

But the economic logic behind infrastructure is straightforward.

A road is not merely concrete and asphalt.

A functional transport corridor can reduce the cost and time involved in moving people and goods. It can connect farmers to markets, manufacturers to consumers, ports to production centres and communities to economic opportunities.

The Lagos-Calabar corridor is intended to strengthen connectivity across a major part of Nigeria’s coastal economic belt, while the Sokoto-Badagry corridor is designed to link agricultural and commercial centres across a vast part of the country.

The economic value of such infrastructure will ultimately depend on completion, quality, maintenance, security and the private investment that develops around the corridors.

The same principle applies to ports, railways and airports.

Efficient ports can reduce the time and cost associated with importing machinery and exporting goods. Rail can connect production centres to markets and ports. Modern airports support business travel, tourism, trade and investment.

Urban transportation systems can improve labour mobility and reduce the economic cost of congestion.

Infrastructure should therefore not be viewed simply as government expenditure. The bigger question is what economic activity that expenditure unlocks.

Nigeria’s electricity crisis also cannot be solved simply by constructing additional power plants.

The structure of the electricity market matters.The Electricity Act 2023 created greater room for state and private-sector participation in electricity generation and distribution.

That is significant because Nigeria’s energy requirements vary across regions.

Industrial clusters require dependable electricity. Technology companies require dependable electricity. Hospitals require dependable electricity. Agricultural processors require dependable electricity. Small businesses require dependable electricity.

A more competitive and functional electricity market can therefore affect virtually every other sector of the economy.

But legislation is only the beginning. The ultimate test is whether electricity becomes more reliable, affordable and available to productive enterprises.

Economic transformation also requires people with the skills to participate in it.

This is where programmes such as NELFUND and 3MTT become relevant.

Student financing can widen access to tertiary education, while technical and digital-skills programmes seek to improve employability in emerging sectors.

Nigeria cannot build an industrial economy without engineers, technicians, teachers, doctors, accountants, scientists, software developers, entrepreneurs and skilled artisans.

Human capital is therefore not simply a welfare issue. It is productive infrastructure.

The development of a functioning credit system is another part of the economic equation.

Institutions such as the Nigerian Consumer Credit Corporation are intended to expand responsible access to credit.

The logic is that government does not have to provide every naira of financing required by the economy. It can instead use guarantees, regulation and specialised institutions to reduce risk and encourage financial institutions to lend.

If responsibly implemented, such mechanisms can help move Nigeria from an economy heavily dependent on cash transactions towards one in which productive credit supports households and businesses.

The increase in the national minimum wage from N30,000 to N70,000 also represents a substantial increase in the statutory wage floor.

But a higher nominal wage does not automatically translate into higher purchasing power.

Inflation determines how much that income can actually buy.

That is why wage policy must be considered alongside productivity, inflation, food prices, transportation costs and social protection.

The administration’s cash-transfer and other social-protection initiatives are similarly important because economic adjustment can impose disproportionate costs on vulnerable households.

Nigeria also cannot build a durable industrial economy while remaining excessively dependent on imported food and raw agricultural commodities.

Mechanisation, irrigation, fertiliser, improved seeds, rural roads and access to finance are important.

But the larger opportunity is to connect agriculture to industrial processing.

The objective should be simple: farm to processing, processing to manufacturing, manufacturing to packaging, packaging to distribution and distribution to export.

A farmer producing cassava is important.

A processing industry turning cassava into starch, ethanol, glucose and other industrial inputs creates another layer of economic value.

The same principle applies to rice, maize, wheat, tomatoes, livestock, cocoa, cotton, fruits and other commodities.

Agriculture becomes significantly more transformative when it is connected to manufacturing.

Regional development is another important dimension of the economic conversation.

The Niger Delta Development Commission predates the Tinubu administration. The more accurate argument is that the current administration has expanded the regional development commission model to other parts of the country, including the North West and South East.

Nigeria’s regions have different economic strengths.

The North West possesses enormous agricultural and livestock potential. The North Central has agricultural, mineral and strategic transport advantages. The South West has strong commercial, financial, manufacturing and technology ecosystems. The South East has deep entrepreneurial and manufacturing capacity. The South South possesses major energy, maritime and industrial assets, while the North East has substantial agricultural, mineral and reconstruction opportunities.

Regional institutions can help organise those strengths around deliberate development strategies.

Nigeria also cannot remain overwhelmingly dependent on crude oil.

The renewed emphasis on solid minerals and efforts to combat illegal mining are therefore significant.

Nigeria has deposits of lithium, gold, tin, tantalite, barite, iron ore and other minerals.

But extraction alone is not enough.

The economic objective should be to move from mineral extraction to processing, from processing to industrial inputs, from industrial inputs to manufacturing and ultimately to exports.

That is how natural-resource wealth can become industrial wealth.

The expansion of the National Identification Number system is another piece of economic infrastructure.

A modern economy needs reliable identity systems.

Identity supports banking, credit, social protection, taxation, public-sector planning and financial inclusion.

The expansion of digital identity is therefore about much more than issuing identification numbers. It is part of building the infrastructure required for a modern economy.

No economic reform can achieve its full potential without security.

Farmers cannot produce efficiently if they cannot safely access their farms.

Factories cannot operate normally when insecurity disrupts supply chains.

Transport costs rise when roads become unsafe.

Investors face additional risks where physical assets and personnel are threatened.

The government’s security operations therefore have an economic dimension beyond the immediate security objective.

Claims concerning the number of terrorists or criminal actors eliminated or surrendered should, however, remain attributed to the relevant security authorities rather than presented as independently verified figures.

The principle remains clear: security is a prerequisite for investment and production.

It is therefore too narrow to evaluate the economic reform programme only by asking whether petrol has become more expensive, whether food is expensive or whether the naira is weaker.

Those questions matter enormously because they affect the daily lives of Nigerians.

But a structural economic assessment must also ask whether the subsidy regime has changed, whether the foreign exchange market has changed, whether fiscal management has improved, whether external buffers have strengthened, whether Nigeria has regained access to international capital markets, whether infrastructure projects are advancing and whether the electricity market is becoming more open.

It must also examine whether students are gaining access to education financing, whether technical skills are being developed, whether large industrial investments are becoming commercially viable, whether Nigerian companies are raising capital, whether domestic production is expanding and whether agricultural commodities are becoming linked to processing and manufacturing.

These are the structural questions.

The reforms, however, are not the destination.

They are the platform.

Removing a subsidy does not automatically create prosperity.

Exchange-rate reform does not automatically create jobs.

Building a highway does not automatically create an industrial economy.

Creating a student-loan system does not automatically produce a skilled workforce.

The reforms must eventually deliver outcomes Nigerians can feel.

That means more productive jobs, higher real incomes, more competitive Nigerian companies, lower production costs, more domestic manufacturing, more exports, affordable credit, better infrastructure, reliable electricity, greater food production, improved security and ultimately a larger and more prosperous middle class.

The most defensible case for President Tinubu’s economic programme is therefore not that Nigeria has already arrived.

The evidence does not support such a conclusion.

The stronger argument is that the administration has attempted to change several structural features of an economy that had accumulated deep distortions over decades.

Fuel subsidies were removed.

The foreign exchange framework was fundamentally restructured.

Deficit monetisation was curtailed.

External buffers improved.

Nigeria returned to international capital markets.

Major infrastructure corridors are under development.

The electricity market has been structurally opened further.

Education financing and technical-skills programmes have expanded.

Consumer-credit institutions have been developed.

The minimum wage has increased.

Agricultural mechanisation and food-security initiatives have expanded.

Regional development institutions have gained greater prominence.

And major industrial assets are increasingly interacting with Nigeria’s capital markets.

The Dangote Refinery is perhaps the clearest illustration of this industrial transition.

It was not built by Tinubu.

But it is operating and expanding within the economic environment that has emerged during his administration.

And in 2026, the refinery entered a new phase through an IPO that Reuters described as Africa’s largest, with an offer of 4.1 billion shares seeking about N2.15 trillion, or $1.6 billion.

That progression captures the larger economic argument:

That is the proposition that should be tested over time.

Not whether Nigeria has become perfect.
It has not.
Not whether Nigerians are experiencing hardship.
They are.

But whether Nigeria is building the economic machinery capable of converting its population, natural resources, infrastructure, entrepreneurial capacity and private capital into sustained productive growth.

If reforms are sustained, investment continues, factories multiply, infrastructure connects production to markets, electricity becomes more reliable, security improves and productivity rises, macroeconomic gains can gradually translate into improvements in household welfare.

From government balance sheets to businesses, from businesses to factories, from factories to workers.

From workers to families.

And from communities to a larger Nigerian middle class.

That is the central promise of renewed economic reform: not instant prosperity, but the possibility of building the productive foundations on which prosperity can ultimately rest.