AES Exit: ECOWAS and Regional Stability, Avoiding Sanctions or Forming a Regional Bloc?
By Raymond Enoch
The ECOWAS Treaty, originally signed in 1975 and revised in 1993, outlines a strict legal framework for member states wishing to exit the ECOWAS union. Article 91 of the revised treaty stipulates that any country seeking to withdraw must provide a written notice to the ECOWAS Executive Secretary or the President as it stands today at least one year in advance.
Looking at the situation at hand in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger Republics that is not what played out. Rather , a deliberate military take over of the realms of power took place at different times and ultimately there occured a convergence of some sort to claim exit from the ECOWAS.
The treaty was clear and states that during this period, the withdrawing country remains bound by all treaty obligations, ensuring that its exit does not disrupt the functioning or stability of the community. This one-year compliance period is designed to provide time for necessary negotiations and allow both the withdrawing state and ECOWAS to manage the transition smoothly.
Additionally, Article 92 of the treaty details transitional provisions, ensuring that rights and obligations under the original 1975 ECOWAS Treaty remain in effect until the revised treaty fully comes into force. This provision guarantees legal continuity and protects the rights and responsibilities of all member states, even in the case of withdrawals.
A significant development has emerged in recent years, with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—three nations that had signed the revised ECOWAS Treaty in 1993—forming a parallel body outside ECOWAS. This move has raised alarms within the ECOWAS Commission, as policy analyst have argued hat these countries are circumventing ECOWAS’ authority, particularly in light of the military coups that have taken place in their governments.
These member states’ creation of a parallel regional bloc has sparked a crucial questions: Are they attempting to avoid sanctions imposed by ECOWAS which is in tandem with the ECOWAS treaty, or are they seeking to negotiate a more favorable position within the regional bloc? Since the military takeovers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, ECOWAS has imposed a series of sanctions, including travel bans, asset freezes, and economic restrictions. The formation of this new alliance could be seen as an attempt to sidestep these punitive measures, which have already had significant political and economic consequences for these countries.
The decision by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to establish a parallel body seems to be a strategic maneuver aimed at bypassing ECOWAS’ sanctions. By distancing themselves from the ECOWAS framework, these countries may be attempting to secure more favorable terms or enhance their influence over regional policies. The formation of a new bloc enables them to challenge the existing order and foster new political alliances, potentially seeming that they may be gaining more autonomy in their dealings with ECOWAS.
However, this strategy comes with considerable risks. The creation of an alternative organization may be undermining ECOWAS’ authority and directly challenges its capacity to maintain regional unity and enforce its protocols. While the new bloc may offer these countries short-term leverage, it could lead to long-term political and economic isolation. The move also jeopardizes the core principles of ECOWAS—namely, cooperation, democracy, and good governance—values which are already under threat in the region.
The ongoing tensions involving Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger present a significant test for ECOWAS’ role in preserving regional stability. As military-led governments gain traction in the Sahel region, ECOWAS must find ways to adapt its strategies while ensuring that its commitment to democratic governance and rule of law remains intact.
The rise of parallel organizations is seen as a direct challenge to ECOWAS’ authority, and the union must carefully balance the enforcement of sanctions with diplomatic engagement to address the concerns of its member states.
The formation of parallel bodies by these countries calls into question ECOWAS’ effectiveness as the primary institution for conflict resolution and the promotion of democratic governance in West Africa. For ECOWAS to maintain its position as a leader in regional integration, it must demonstrate its ability to adapt to evolving political landscapes and ensure that its foundational principles are upheld.
As the political dynamics in West Africa continue to evolve, the actions of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger present a pivotal question for ECOWAS. These nations’ decision to form a parallel bloc tests the institution ability to adapt to shifting geopolitical realities and to maintain the unity that has long defined West Africa. At this critical juncture, the ECOWAS Commission must focus on reinforcing its legal frameworks, ensuring the continued respect for democratic principles, and fostering dialogue to address the concerns of all member states.
Ultimately, only through strong governance, adherence to its foundational treaties, and an ongoing commitment to regional integration can ECOWAS emerge from these challenges stronger and more resilient. By ensuring that all member states respect the principles of cooperation, democracy, and good governance, ECOWAS can chart a path forward toward long-term peace, stability, and sustainable development for West Africa.
